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FIRM PERFORMANCE AND INSIDER TRADING: A COMPARISON BETWEEN 
VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 
Jeffrey Donaldson. University of Tampa 
Robert Weigand, Washburn University 
We compare tite finan cial performance ami insider tradin~ characte~istics of .(irms f!ling for voluntary 
bankruptcy witit firms titat are petitioned into bankruptcy t~volw1f~rtf~, by thetr credttors. We find that 
I ' olders oiffirms filino fior voluntary bankruptcy expertence stgnificantly greater losses around the s tarett t> 1 · "d iffi bankruptcy announcement titan sitareitolders of involuntary filers. We also find t wt mst ers o tr~tzs 
filing voluntari(v are net sellers of titeir firm's sit ares in the years leading up to bankruptcy, vs. net ~uymg 
by insiders of involuntary filers. Moreover, firms filing volun~ary bankruptcy successfully reorga~tze less 
frequently and liquidate more frequently titan firms that file mvoluntary bankruptcy. These findmgs are 
consistent wit ft tite idea titat corporate insiders in firms filing for voluntary bankruptcy itave reduced 
incentives to maximize sitareitolder welfare titrougitout the Chapter 11 process co_mpared with insiders of 
firms tit at are petitioned into bankruptcy by titeir creditors. 
Introd uction 
Much of the resea rch in the area of fin ancial 
distre s and bankruptcy foc uses on whether managers 
have the proper incenti ves to maxi mi ze shareholder 
we lfa re during periods of fi nancial distress (e.g., Bradley 
and Rosenzwe ig 1992, 1995. Altman 1993, Betker 
1995a. and Chen. Weston and Altman 1995) . We 
inve tigate the fin ancial performance and insider trading 
characteri stics of firm s during the years leading up to 
their filing for corporate bankruptcy. In particular. we 
compare firm s filin g for vo luntary bankruptcy with firm s 
that are peti ti oned into bankruptcy in vo luntarily by their 
cred itors. We find that shareholders of firms filin g for 
vo luntary bankruptcy experience significantly greater 
lo ses around the bankruptcy announcement than 
hareholders of invo luntary fi lers, and that in siders of 
firms filin g vo luntarily are net se llers of their firm's 
hare in the years leadi ng up to bankruptcy (vs. net 
insider buying by managers of involuntary fil ers). We 
also find that fi rms fi ling for vo luntary bankruptcy 
uccessfully reorganize less frequently and liquidate 
more frequent ly than firms that enter invo luntary 
bankruptcy. The e findings are consistent with the idea 
that corporate in siders in firms filing for vo luntary 
bankruptcy have reduced incentives to maximize 
hareholder we lfare throughout the Chapter II process 
compared with managers of firm s that are petitioned into 
bankruptcy by their creditors. 
The debate regarding managerial behavior durin o 
bankruptcy is as old as U.S. bankruptcy law itse lf. In th: 
ea rl I ~OOs bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by 
complaint from the firm's creditors, similar to what is 
now referred to as involuntary bankruptcy. In those 
12 
times formal bankruptcy was viewed as a criminal act-
debtors unable to satisfy their debts were often 
incarcerated . Liquidation of the firm was usually the end 
result, and if creditors were not pa id in full following 
liquidation, debtors freq uently remained incarcerated . 
Attitudes regarding bankruptcy changed 
substantially during the 1800s. The first provision in 
U.S. law permitting the discharge of debt is found in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Restri ctions on the filing of 
bankruptcy were further re laxed by passage of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. reflectin g a gradual decline in 
the stigma as oc iated with financial distress . Over the 
course of the 19'" century the perception of bankruptcy 
evo lved from that of an offense to the economic 
com muni ty deserving of punishment to nothing more 
than an unfortunate financial state of affa irs. 
In response to the large number of business failures 
during the Great Depression, the Bankruptcy Acts of 
1933 and 1934 permitted vo luntary filin gs for the first 
time. Under the new system. managers retained their 
pos iti ons and played a major role in determining the 
course of the firm 's reorgani zati on. Thi s change in 
procedure prompted numerous claims that managers 
were abusing the process for their own ga in at the 
expense of shareholders, and the SEC launched an 
investigation . The results of that in vestigation , contained 
in the Douglas Report , concluded that managers 
responsible for firm s' poor financial performance 
remained in office too long and acted in a self-serving 
manner to the detriment of public investors . 
The findin gs of the Douglas Report led to passage 
of the Chandler Act of 1939, which removed a 
substantial amount of managerial di scretion during the 
bankruptcy process. Voluntary bankruptcy remained a 
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rare provision under the code, and firms that filed 
vo luntary bankruptcy were often sued to allow more 
contro l by cred itors. These laws remained largely 
unchanged until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
This legis lation re-introduced the pre-1939 practice of 
voluntary bankruptcy filing, which a llows managers to 
remain with the firm and exert a significant influence on 
the company's reorganization. The I 978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act a lso eliminated the SEC's role tn 
investigating bankruptcies. Predictably, in the first year 
following implementation of the reform act, 85% of 
bankruptcies were vo lun tary filings by managers (see 
Wruck 1990). 
Existing theoretica l models often assume that 
managers are acting in the interests of shareholders 
during bankruptcy (e.g., Altman I 993 , Betker I 995a, 
and Chen, Weston and A ltman 1995). The results of 
numerous empirical studies of bankruptcy and financial 
di stress provide support for thi s assumpti on. Khanna and 
Poul sen ( I 995) find that the strategies of managers of 
di stressed firms (e .g., downsizing, capita l structure 
changes, investments and spin-offs) are si milar to those 
of managers of healthy fi nns in the same industry. As a 
result, they conc lude that managers of distressed finn s 
often serve as scapegoats , shou ldering more of the blame 
for their firm s' misfortunes than is justified. Denis and 
Denis ( 1995) provide further evidence on this issue . 
They find that externa l factors such as recession and 
regulatory change are important in causing financia l 
distress. which suggests that managers may not be solely 
respon sible for the firm's poor financial performance. 
Lang and Stu lz ( 1992) present evide ce of contagion 
surrounding bankruptcy announcements, which also 
implies that financial distress may be at least partly 
caused by industry-wide factors. Betker (I 995b) finds 
that fir ms negotiating prepackaged bankruptcies spend 
less time in financial distress than firms entering 
traditional Chapter II , whi ch suggests that the managers 
of these firms pursue strategies intended to minimize the 
impact of financial distress on shareho lder wealth . 
Other researchers conclude that there is a greater 
mi sa li gnment of manager and shareho lder interests when 
firms enter bankruptcy, however. One factor that 
contributes to this problem is that incentive contracts 
(performance-based bonuses and stock options) lose 
most of their va lue and are less effective for aligning the 
interests of managers and shareho lders when firm s are in 
financial distress (Wruck 1990 and Aghion , Hart, and 
Moore 1992). 
Seyhun and Bradley ( 1997) present evidence 
that suggests a mi sa lignment of incentives during 
bankruptcy. They find that insiders se ll a significant 
13 
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portion of their finn's stock in the years prior to filing a 
bankruptcy petition . Seyhun and Bradley acknow ledge 
that while this fact a lone does not constitute prima facie 
evidence that managers have breached their fiduciary 
responsibilities to shareholders, it is nonetheless true that 
corporate insiders who reduce their ho ldings of their 
firm's shares also reduce their incentive to maximize 
shareholder value. This idea is further supported by the 
findings of Betker (I 995a), who reports a positive 
relation between shareholder gains during Chapter I I 
and the level of insider holdings in the firm . 
Other studies conc lude that managers place their 
firms into bankruptcy to capture the job protection 
awarded them during the Chapter I I process . Delaney 
(1992), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) , White (1983), 
Wruck ( 1990), Aghion, Hart and Moore ( 1992), and 
Hotchkiss ( 1995) all suggest that managers whose fim1s 
are in financial distress may have a preference for 
Chapter I I because of the greater job protection afforded 
by the bankruptcy process . LoPucki and Whitford ( 1993) 
also document that generous compensation and 
severance contracts ("golden parachutes") are often 
awarded to top managers when the firm is in the midst of 
a bankruptcy reorganization. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig ( 1992) suggest that 
managers pursue sub-opti ma l operat in g strategies at 
shareholders' expense during the bankruptcy period , and 
that these managers may be seeki ng to obtain large 
severance contracts and further entrench themselves in 
their firms when they file a vo luntary bankruptcy 
petition . They a lso find that firms entering bankruptcy 
are financially healthier following the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act- post-Act firms have signifi cantly higher 
return on assets for the five years leadi ng up to the 
bankruptcy filing . Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) 
further report that shareho lder losses for the six-month 
period surrounding the bankruptcy announcement are 
much larger fol low ing bankruptcy reform (- 63% vs. 
-36% in the pre-Act period). Rimbey, Anderson and 
Born ( 1995) report si milar findings: negative returns to 
shareho lders around bankruptcy announcements are 
exacerbated following the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 
If, as suggested by numerous authors, there is an 
increased misalignment of manager and shareholder 
interests when firms enter bankruptcy, we would expect 
to observe these firms perform ing poorly over an 
extended period of time. Hotchkiss ( 1995) documents 
poor long-term performance for firms fi ling bankruptcy 
under the Reform Act. She reports that 40% of firms 
emerging from bankruptcy continue to suffer losses in 
the three years following bankruptcy, with a significant 
number of second and third filings for these firms . 
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Hotchkiss ( 1995) concludes that thi s l on g~term 
underperformance is largely due to the contmued 
invo lvement of pre-bankruptcy management, and that 
Chapter 11 is not an effecti ve influence on the 
rehabilitation of distressed firm s. 
Given that there is a di st inction in both law and 
practice between vo luntary and invo luntary bankrupt~y 
fili ngs, and that most of the signifi cant changes 111 
bankruptcy law over the past 70 years have been 
concerned with whether or not it is appropriate to allow 
managers to file vo luntary Chapter I I and continue thei r 
involvement with the firm, we examine whether there 
are any economic differences between the two types of 
fi lings. If there is an increased mi sa lignment of manager 
and shareholder interests when firm s enter bankruptcy, 
we hypothe ize that ev idence of thi s misa lignment of 
incentives wi ll be more ev ident in firm s fi ling for 
vo luntary bankruptcy, where manager have the 
opportunity to use bankruptcy as part of thei r overall 
corporate trategy. 
Our tudy i therefore an empirical invest igati on 
of difference between firms that fi le for vo lun tary 
bankruptcy v . firms enteri ng invo luntary bankruptcy via 
cred itor pet itions. We foc us on differences in the 
financ ial hea lth and performance of these firms, patterns 
of in ider trading lead ing up to the bankruptcy filin g, 
and differences in their post-bankruptcy outcomes. We 
find little difference in the fin ancial conditi on of the two 
ubgroup in the year leading up to a bankruptcy fi ling. 
We find that shareholders of firm s fi lin g for vo luntary 
bankruptcy ea rn tock return s that are significantly more 
negative than shareholder of invo luntary filers, 
however, leadin g up to and follow ing the bankruptcy 
announcement. Wea l o find that insiders of firm s filin g 
vo luntarily are net ellers of their firm's shares in the 
year leadin g up to bankruptcy, v . net in ider buying for 
the involuntary fi ler . Moreover, firms filing vo lun tary 
bankruptcy successfully reorganize less frequent ly and 
liquidate more frequently than firm s that file invo luntary 
bankruptcy. These findin g are consistent with the idea 
that th ere is a greater reduction in managerial incentives 
to max imi ze hareholder we lfare in firms filin o for 
voluntary bankruptcy vs . firm that are petitioned
0 
into 
bankruptcy by their creditor . 
The results of this study have implications for 
regulator and legi lators that establish policy governing 
bankruptcy and insider tradin g laws. For examp le, ca ll s 
for rev iew and reform of the e laws have accompanied 
the recent high-profil e bankruptcy fi lings of firm s such 
a Enron and Global Cros ing, Ltd . Insiders of these 
firm are e timated to have earned anywhere from $1 
billion ( nron) to $ 1.3 billion (Global Crossing) by 
14 
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se lling stock in their companies over the three year 
period preceding their bankruptcy filings. Outraged 
creditors of these firms have formed committees charged 
with investigating all insider sales that took place within 
12 months of the bankruptcy filin g, with the intention of 
claiming the proceeds from some of these insider 
transactions . In a similar move, Ama lgamated Bank filed 
a lawsuit all eging illega l insider trading that seeks to 
freeze the bank accounts of seni or executives at Enron. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The sa mpl e of firms filing fo r bankruptcy was 
comp il ed by searching the Wall Street Journal Index, 
Lexis/Nexis fi les, and from information obta ined from 
the IndepthData Corporation and the New Generation 
Research Company. Lexis/.Nexis search terms include: 
vo luntary bankruptcy; volu ntary petition ; vo luntary 
Chapter II ; involuntary bankruptcy; invo luntary 
petition ; and involuntary Chapter II . All of the 
involuntary fi lings represent court-fi led petitions by a 
minimum of three creditors under rule 303 (b) I of the 
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. These petitions were filed 
under the grounds stipu lated in rule 303 (h) where the 
"debtor is generally not paying debts as they become 
due." 
Firms were included in the sample if their 
bankruptcy filin g date occurs between October I, 1979 
(the date the Reform Act was implemented) and 
December 3 1, 1994. We focus on these dates to avoid 
the confounding effect of the unusuall y high stock 
returns earned during the period 1995-1999. The original 
sample contains 368 voluntary and I I 0 involuntary 
Chapter I I bankruptcy annou ncements. Firms were 
subsequent ly eliminated from the sample if they were 
privately held, or according to Lexis/Nexis were "not 
pub licly traded, too small , or otherwise inappropriate for 
coverage. " Application of thi s screen reduced the sample 
size to 222 vo luntary and 5 1 involuntary filings . Firms 
with excessive miss ing return s on the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database were also 
exc luded from the sample. Thi s further reduced the 
sample size to 176 vo luntary fil ers and 42 invo luntary 
filers. Additiona lly, firm s that entered bankruptcy 
primari ly due to adverse outcomes in lawsuits (e.g., 
asbestos cases) were del eted , a were utilities and 
financial firm ( IC codes in the 4900s and 6000s) due 
to the regulatory constraints imposed on these industries. 
App lication of these screens reduced the final sample 
size to 150 vo luntary and 34 involuntary bankruptcy 
filin gs. 
Table I presents the distribution of the sample over 
time and by SIC code. The frequency of vo luntary and 
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involuntary filings increases begi nning around the 
"cred it crunch" of the late 1980s, and remains hi gh 
through the 1991 recession. While the rate of 
invo luntary filings slows afterward, the frequency of 
vo luntary fi I ings remains curiously high through the 
economic recovery of the early 1990s. 
Jou rn al of Business and Leadership : Research. Practi ce. and Teaching 
Thi s table describes the sample of firms fi li ng 
voluntary and invo luntary bankruptcy petitions. The 
percentages of total observations by year are shown in 
the panel at left, and the percentage of total observat ions 
by the first digit of the firm's SIC code are shown at the 
pane l at right. 
Table 1: Sample Description by Year and SIC Code 
Obse rvatio ns by Year O bse rvati ons by S IC Cod e 
vear vo luntarv in voluntary first S IC digit volunta rv lnvoluntarv 
1980 3.3o/o 2.9% I 8.7% 14 .7% 
19 81 2.7% 5.9% 2 12.0% 5.9% 
1982 9.3% 2.9% 3 26.7% 26.5% 
1983 6.0% 8.8% 4 8.0% 14 .7% 
1984 1.3% 5.9% 5 30.7% 17.6% 
1985 2.7% 2.9% 6 2.7% 2.9% 
1986 0.0% 2.9% 7 8.7% 14 .7% 
1987 2.0% 5.9% 8 2.0% 2.9% 
1988 1.3% 2.9% 9 07% 0.0% 
1989 4 .0% 11.8% 
1990 6.0% 8.8% 
199 1 18.7% 17.6% 
1992 1-1 .7% 8.8% 
1993 14.0% 2.9% 
1994 14 .0% 8.8% 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Firm C harac teris tic mea n 
(i n S IOOOs) vo lunta rv involunt arY 
Book \ "a lue of .-\ssets 165.950 5 17.380 
:\ct In co me -24.400 -6.800 
i\ l arket Ca pitalization 32.600 2 11 .270 
Sa les 276.680 446.490 
Lono-tcrm Debt Ratio 25 .02% 34.25% 
· -
... 
** * S1gmt !cantl y d 1fterent at the one and t1ve percent levels. respective ly. 
The table above shows descriptive statistics for the 
sample of firms filin g vo luntary and invo luntary 
bankruptcy petitions. Data are reported as year-end 
fi gures fo r the year preceding the bankruptcy 
an nouncement. The !-statistics and Wilcoxon stati stics 
test whether the mean and med ian firm characteristics 
are s ignifi cantly different from one another. Descripti ve 
statistics regarding the two types of firm s are shown as 
table 2. These data are reported as year-end figures for 
the year immediate ly preceding the bankruptcy 
ann ouncement. Examination of table 2 revea ls that firms 
filing involuntary bankruptcy are larger than the 
vo luntary firm s in terms of both their book value of 
assets and market capitalization. The involuntary fil ers 
also have greater average sales vo lume than their 
vo luntary counterparts, which would be expected given 
their larger size. We find little difference in leverage 
between the two types of firm s. Invo luntary filers have 
an average long-term debt-to-assets ratio of 34% vs. 
25% for the voluntary filers. Simi lar to the results 
reported by Chatterjee, Dhiilon and Ramirez ( 1996), we 
find that smaller firms with lower debt level s tend to fil e 
15 
median 
r-s ta tis tic voluntary in vo lunta rY Wilcoxon 
1.55 4 7.420 163.230 3.23 • 
-0.38 -4 .970 -3 .3 10 -0. 17 
1.9 1 12.-1 36 16.460 0.69 
1.97* 63.270 22 1.060 2. 15* 
0.5 -1 18.20% 3 1.67% 0.82 
for vo luntary Chapter 11 . The on ly evidence that the 
voluntary filers might be sli ghtly worse off financi ally 
comes fro m comparing the average net income of the 
two groups. Although the mean ann ual ea rnings of both 
groups are negative, the vo luntary filers post sl ightl y 
larger annual losses on a signifi cant ly lower leve l of 
annual sa les. The average profit margin in the year 
preced ing bankruptcy of the vo luntary filers is -8 .8% , 
compared with on ly -1.5% for the in vo luntary fi lers. 
In the fo llowin g sect ion we compare the pre-
bankruptcy performance and cap ital structure of the 
vo luntary and involuntary fil ers . Mean and median 
return on assets, operating margin and debt ratios for the 
four years preceding the year of the bankruptcy 
announcement are obtained from Compustat. We 
compare the pre-bankruptcy financial performance and 
capi tal structure of the voluntary and involuntary filers to 
see if differences in these variables might influence 
managers' decision to fi le for voluntary Chapter II 
bankruptcy. 
We obta in daily stock price data fro m the CRSP 
database to investigate differences in the returns of the 
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· 1 t y filers immed iately voluntary and rn vo un ar I 
urroundin o the bankruptcy announcement, as we ll as 
fo r the yea~ preceding and fo llowing the announcement. 
Previou researchers (Rimbey. Anderson and Born , 
1995) report that estimates of beta become un ~tab le 
around announcements of bankruptcy fi l i t~ gs. If nsk IS 
chanoi ng as firms enter bankruptcy, usrng pre-event 
mark~t 1~1 ode l parameters may misstate the ac tual exce~s 
ed b\' t11ese fi rms We find that the fi rms 111 retu rn s earn · 
our sampl e exhibit j ust such a change in beta . The mean 
pre-event (day -270 to -121) ordinary lea t squares 
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research. Practice. and Teaching 
market model beta fo r the vo luntary filers is 0.67. which 
increases to 0.85 in the post-event period (days + 12 1 to 
+270). The invo luntary filers experience a decrease_ in 
their beta from the pre-event (0 .85) to post-event penod 
(0.24). 
Due to the apparent instabili ty of beta, we report 
abnormal returns calcul ated without market mode l 
parameters, using instead a measure of buy an~ hold 
compound returns adjusted for market effects ustng the 
CRSP va lue-we ighted index of all NYSE and Amex 
stocks . 
" h 
ER!(aioh) = 0 (1 + R,l )-n (1 +MR 1 ) ( I ) 
l=ll J=a 
In Eq uation ( 1 ), E RJ(a to b)= excess return for fi rm 
j from time peri od a to b (days -252 to +252 rela tive to 
the bankruptcy ann ouncement day (day zero)): R,1 = the 
ra\\ re tu rn fo r fi rm j on day 1: and 1\fR 1 = the retu rn on 
the CRSP va lue-\\ eighted index of all NYS E and Amex 
stocks. As we contend that insiders of firm s fi lin g 
vo luntary bankruptcy ex perience a greater misa lignment 
of incenti ves to max imize hareholder va lue. we expect 
to fi nd signifi cantl y greater lo ses accrui ng to 
hareholders in the e firms compared with shareholders 
of fi rm s entering in vo luntary bankruptcy. 
As would be expected in a study of fi rm s fi ling 
ba nkruptcy. a sub tant ial number of the firms in our 
ample are delisted dur ing the event window spanning 
davs 0 to +252 . Shumway ( 1997) exami nes the accuracy 
of-the delisting retu rns ava ilable on the CRSP database 
and reports th at these return s are mi ss ing for the 
majority of fi rms covered by CRSP. Failure to include 
the delistin g return s of the stocks in our sample in the 
buy and hold return ca lculations would impart an 
upward bias to these returns. We therefore foliO\\ the 
recommendation of Shumway and insert hi s estimate of 
the va lue of the average mi ss ing delisting return on 
RSP (- 30%) for all the fi rms in our sample that have 
mi sing deli st in g return 
We also inve ti gate insider trading in the years 
lead ing up to the bankruptcy filin g (years -2 and - 1) 
and the year beginning with the month in whic h the 
bankruptcy announcement takes place (year 0). Data on 
insider trading are obtained from the SEC's Insider 
Trading Tape . Loderer and heehan ( 1989) fi nd no 
ev idence of in ider trading prior to bankruptcy, whil e 
Go nell. Keown and Pinkerton ( 1992) fi nd that onl y 
in ider of a daq fi rm "ba il out" prior to bankruptcy. 
ore recent research reports ignificant net insider 
16 
sell ing leading up to .bankruptcy filin gs, however 
(Seyhun and Bradl ey 1997) . 
We investigate di fferences in in sider trading 
benveen our samples of vo luntary and invo luntary filers. 
We report both the net number of shares traded and total 
dollar volume of trades by insiders. Fo llowing Seyhun 
and Bradl ey ( 1997) we use a _narrow definition of 
in siders: the firm's president, CEO, chairman of the 
board of directors, and a ll board members. Finding 
significantly greater insider se lling among the vo luntary 
fil ers would prov ide upport for the view that managers 
and other in siders of fi rms filin g for vo luntary Chapter 
11 bankruptcy have reduced incentives to maximize 
shareholder va lue. Also, if managers possess superior 
info rmation regarding the fi rm's future prospects. finding 
more in siders buying among the invo luntary filers al so 
suggests th at managers of these firm s perceive a higher 
probabi I ity of successful reorganization than managers 
of fi rms that fi le fo r voluntary bankruptcy. 
We obtain data fro m The Directory of Obsolele 
Securities, Lexis/Nexis, and Reuters Financial Services 
regarding post-bankruptcy outcomes . In particular, we 
compare the rate with whi ch voluntary and involuntary 
fil ers merge with or are taken over by other finns , 
reorgani ze successfull y, or undergo liquidation. Previous 
research (Hotchki ss 1995) concludes that poor long-term 
performance followin g bankruptcy is caused by the 
continued invo lvement of the management team that led 
the firm into bankruptcy. Finding a greater rate of failure 
and/or liquidation among the voluntary filers would 
prov ide further support for the idea that managers have 
reduced incenti ves to max imize shareh older value when 
firm s fil e for vo luntary Chapter II bankruptcy. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We present our empirical results in the following 
5
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fo ur sub-sections . The first sub-secti on reports measures 
of finn performance and leverage for the fo ur years 
preceding the year in which firm s announce bankruptcy. 
The second sub-secti on presents changes in shareho lder 
wea lth during the yea rs preceding and fo llowing the 
bankruptcy announ cement. T he third sub-secti on re ports 
in s ider trad ing leading up to and fo ll owing bankruptcy. 
Th e fo urth sub-sec tion presents the post-bankruptcy 
outcomes for the vo luntary and in vo luntary fil ers. 
Firm P erformance and Leverage Before Bankruptcy 
Tab le 3 prese nts measures of firm perfo rmance and 
Journal of Business and Leadershi p: Research. Practice. and Teaching 
leverage for the four years preceding the year in which 
firm s announce bankruptcy. We investigate whether 
there are s ignifi cant differences in profitability and 
leverage between the vo luntary and invo luntary fi nns 
pri or to filin g fo r bankruptcy. If the fi nancia l cond iti on 
and performance of the two types of firm s is s im ilar 
lead ing up to the bankruptcy fi I in g, it is less I ike ly that 
finan c ia l factors are a s ignifi cant influence on managers' 
dec is ion to fil e fo r vo luntary bankruptcy. 
Mea 1 performance and characteri st ic measures are 
presented in Pane l A . Return on assets (ROA) is 
computed as in Hotchkiss ( 1995): 
ROA = operating income before depreciation and amortization 
total assets 
(2) 
Both types of firm s exhibit steady downtrend s in 
their mean ROA fo r the fo ur years preceding 
bankruptcy. T he vo luntary fil ers exhibit cons istent ly 
hi gher ROA than the in vo lun tary fil ers fo r each yea r 
except year - 1, w hen the ir ROA dec lines prec ipi to usly. 
The di ffe rence-between-the-means /-stati sti cs are 
insignificant fo r each year, ind icat ing no di fference in 
the mean ROA of the vo luntary and invo luntary fil ers. 
Table 3: Pre-Bankruptcy Performance 
Pa nel A: mea n per forma nce measure na r -4 
re turn on assets 
vo lun tary 8.18% 
in vo luntary 4.82% 
r-statist ic - 1.06 
opera ting ma rgin 
vo luntary -0.84% 
invo lun tary 3.3~ C}-O 
/-statist ic 0.53 
long-term debt r a ti o 
vo luntarv 25 .83% 
in vo luntary 30 .26% 
r-stat isti c 0.96 
Pa nel B: medi a n perfo rma nce meas ure vea r -4 
return on asse ts 
vo luntary 11 .00% 
in vo luntary 9.82% 
Wi lcoxon - 1. 13 
operating m :.~ rg in 
vo lu ntary 6.92% 
in vo luntary 8.05% 
Wilcoxon 0.40 
long-term d ebt ra ti o 
vo luntary 25 .90% 
in vo luntary 30.64% 
Wilcoxon 0.78 
The tabl e above presents firm characteri stic and 
performance measures fo r the fo ur yea rs leadin g up to 
the year of the bankruptcy announcement. Results are 
reported for th e subsampl es of firm s filin g vo luntary and 
invo luntary bankruptcy. Return on assets is computed as 
in Hotchki ss ( 1995) : operating income before 
deprec iation and amorti zati on/total assets. Operating 
margin = ope ratin g income/sa les , and the long-term debt 
ratio = long-term de bt/tota l assets. The /-stati stics and 
Wilcoxon stati stics test whether the mean and medi an 
17 
vca r -3 na r -2 vea r - I 
5.8-l% 0.05% -9.0 1% 
1.23% -1.88% -3 .56% 
-0.90 -0.05 0.60 
-2 .15% -8 .25% - 11. 14% 
0.56% -7.53% 0.87% 
0.5 1 0.60 1.1 7 
26.72% 28 .68% 25 .02% 
35 .20% 36.19% 34.25% 
1. 80 1.39 1.4 1 
na r -3 vea r -2 vear - I 
8.66% 6.61% -0 .08% 
7.82% 6.09% 3.74% 
-0.90 -0.52 0.86 
5.73% 4.46% 0.07% 
5.98% 4.86% 3.66% 
0.64 0.65 1.4 8 
26.56% 24 .58% 18.20% 
36.95% 33.42% 3 1.67% 
1.3 1 1.44 1. 77 
characteri sti cs of the subgroups are signifi cant ly 
di ffe rent. The next pe rfo rmance measure reported in 
Pane l A of table 3 is mean operating marg in , defin ed as 
operating income/sa les. O perating marg in declines 
steadil y during the fo ur-year period, w ith the exception 
of an increase in year -1 fo r the invo lunta ry fi lers. We 
find no s ignificant di ffe rence in the mean operat ing 
marg in s of the two types of firm s. The ave rage long-
term debt ratios (long-term debt/tota l assets) for each 
type of bankruptcy fi I ing are consi stent and stable fo r the 
6
Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 1 [2005], No. 1, A t. 3
http://scholars.fhsu.edu/jbl/vol1/iss1/3
Donaldson and Weigand 
fo ur years leading up to bankruptcy. Once again, there is 
no ignifi cant di ffe rence in leverage between the 
vo lun ta ry and in vo luntary fi lers in any of the pre-
bankruptcy years. 
Panel B of tab le 3 present medi an performance and 
characteri t ic measures fo r the two types of fi rms. The 
fi ndings are si milar to tho e pre ented in Panel A. ROA 
and operat ing margi n are dec lining fo r each of the four 
pre-bankru ptcy years. Long-term debt ratios are 
con i tent and tab le. and none of the measures reported 
are ignificantly different in any of the years leading up 
to bankruptcy. We interpret the e findin gs a evidence 
that the fi nancial perfo rmance and leverage of the two 
type of fi rm s are simi lar during the pre-bankru ptcy 
period . Both vo luntary and in vo lun tary fi ler are in the 
mid t of a long-term dec li ne in profitabi lity, and neither 
exhi bit a signifi cant change in leverage prior to 
bankruptcy. There i no ev idence that differences in the 
pre-ba nkruptcy fi nancial condition of the e fi rms 
in fl uences the type of bankruptcy fi ling. 
Changes in ha reholder Wealth 
We examine change in shareholder wea lth 
over fo ur tradin g periods relative to the bankruptcy 
Journal of Business and Leadership : Research. Practi ce. and Teaching 
announcement (day zero) : days -252 to - 22: days - 2 1 to 
+2 1; days - 1 to + I; and days +22 to +2 52 . Compound 
buy and hold excess returns (see equation I) are reported 
in tab le 4. The buy and ho ld returns from days - 2 1 to 
+2 1 are also shown as fi gure I , and the buy and hold 
returns from days -252 to +252 are shown as fi gure 2. 
During the period preceding the bankruptcy 
announcement (days -252 to - 22) the stock price 
perfo rmance of the voluntary fil ers is significant ly more 
negat ive than that of the invo luntary fi lers: - 81 .2% vs.-
6 1.5%. The e buy and hold returns are significantly 
different at the one percent level (1 = I 1.9 1 ). Over the 
two month period immedi ately preced ing and following 
the announcement (days -2 1 to +2 1 ), the vo luntary fil ers 
al o exhibit greater losses: -3 1.2% vs. -22.4% for the 
involuntary fi lers (1 = 5 . 8~) . The buy and hold return s 
immed iate ly surrounding the bankruptcy announcement 
(days - I to + I) are also significa ntly more negati ve for 
the vo luntary fil er : - I 0.3% percent vs . -5 .4% percent 
for the invo luntary firm s (1 = 3. 19). Figure I shows that 
the returns of the tvvo type of fi rms are similar from 
day -2 1 to -2, but the more negati ve returns earned by 
the vo luntary fil ers around the bankruptcy 
announce ment persist through day +2 1. 
Figure 1: Buy and Hold Excess Returns F rom Days - 21 to +21 r -~- . . ~ 
; .• ~= 
l " ' l 
The fig ure hown above depi cts 
buy and hold exce s return fo r the 




bankruptcy. The trad ing window span days - 2 1 to 
+2 1 relati ve to th e bankru ptcy announcement (day 
zero). 
Figure 2: Buy and Hold Excess Returns From Days - 252 to +252 
" O.yfl. •t_.lv.to ...,.,._•-O·~ 
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The fi gure in the previous page depicts compound 
buy and ho ld excess returns (computed as shown in 
Equation I) for the subsamples of firms filin g voluntary 
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research . Practice. and Teaching 
and involuntary bankruptcy. The trading wi ndow span s 
days -252 to +252 relative to the bankruptcy 
announcement (day zero). 
Table 4: Buy and Hold Excess Returns 
Tradino Window Voluntary Involuntary /-statistic 
-252 to -22 -81 .2% -61 .5% 11.9 1. 
-21 to +2 1 -3 1.2% -22.4% 5.82 ' ' 
-1 to+ l ·10.3% -5.4% 3.19" 
+22 to +25 2 ·57 .1% ·36.3% 15.26' 
•• Sigmficantl y diffe rent from zero at the one percent level. 
T he table above reports compound buy and ho ld 
excess returns (computed as shown in Eq uat ion I) for 
the subsampl es of firms filin g vo luntary and involuntary 
bankruptcy. T he trading window defi nes the days 
relative to the event day over whi ch the excess returns 
are measured (day zero = the day the firm announces it 
is filin g fo r o r has been petit ioned into bankruptcy). The 
!-stati sti cs test w hether the buy and ho ld excess returns 
of the vo luntary and invo luntary filers are s ignificantly 
different from each other. Over the e leven month s 
following the bankruptcy announcement (days +22 to 
+252) the vo luntary filers cont inue to post s ignifi cantly 
greater losses than the invo luntary tilers: -57 . I% vs. -
36.3% for the in vo luntary til ers (t = 15.26) . This findin g 
is confirm ed by examination of Fi gure 2. In a ll four 
subperi ods examined , the vo luntary filers earn excess 
return s that a re s ignifi cant ly more negati ve than the 
invo luntary fil ers. The market evidently interprets the 
announcement of a vo luntary bankruptcy ti li ng as more 
negat ive for the future prospects of he firm than the 
announcement of an invo luntary ban kruptcy petition 
tiling by the finn's creditors. These findings are 
consistent w ith the idea that corporate inside rs in tinns 
tiling fo r vo luntary bankruptcy have reduced incentives 
to maximize shareho ld~r welfare throughout the C hapter 
I I process compared with manage rs of firms that are 
petitioned into invo luntary bankruptcy. 
Insider Trading Preceding and Following the 
Bankruptcy Announcement 
Results regardin g average in sider trading for the 
two types of bankruptcy filin gs are presented in table 5. 
We report the average annual net number of shares 
traded by insiders (Panel A) and the average annual net 
dollar volume of trade by insiders (Panel B). In both 
cases, a negative number indicates that ins iders are 
divesting themse lves of the stock of their firm ( in term s 
of shares or dollars), and a positive number indicates that 
ins iders are accumulating stock in their firm . Results are 
reported for year<> - 2, -1 and the year beginning with 
19 
the month in which the bankruptcy announcement takes 
place (year zero) . Pane l A of table 5 shows that insiders 
of firms ti I ing vo luntary bankruptcy are net se llers of 
shares in all three years, with the largest volume of net 
shares so ld occurring in the year immediate ly preceding 
the bankruptcy tiling (year - I ). This contrasts sharply 
w ith the trading patterns of in siders in firms tiling 
invo luntary bankruptcy. Insiders of these firm s are net 
buyers of shares in years -2 and - 1, and se ll 
s ignifi cantly less shares in the year fo llowi ng the 
bankruptcy announcement (an average of 27,000 shares 
vs. 72,000 for the vo luntary tilers). 
These results are a lso depicted as fi gure 3, 
which shows the cumul at ive insider trading in shares for 
both types of firms . In the two years preceding and the 
year of the bankruptcy announcement, ins iders of finn s 
filin g vo luntary bankruptcy divest themse lves of over 
300,000 shares, while ins iders of firm s petitioned into 
bankruptcy by the ir creditors acc um ulate over 20,000 
new shares during the same period . We interpret these 
findin gs as strong evidence that in s iders of firms filing 
vo luntary bankruptcy have a greater reduct ion in their 
incentives to maximi ze shareho lde r wealth compared 
with ins iders of firm s filin g invo luntary bankruptcy. 
T hi s table reports ave rage in s ider trading per firm 
for the sampl es of firm s filin g vo luntary and in vo luntary 
bankruptcy. Insiders are defined as the firm 's president, 
CEO, and members of the board of directors. Results are 
reported for the two years preceding bankruptcy and the 
year of the bankruptcy tiling (yea r zero) . Pane l A reports 
the net number of shares traded, by yea r and 
cumulat ive ly. Pane l 8 reports the net do llar amount of 
insider buying or se lling, by year and cumulatively. 
Pane l 8 of table 5 reports average annual net doll ar 
volume of in sider trading for vo luntC~ry and involuntary 
tilers. C umulative average net do llar trading by insiders 
of both types of firm s is al so depicted as fi gure 4. 
Although insiders from both types of firms are buyers in 
net do llar terms in year -2 , the average buying by 
insiders of the involuntary fil ers is over four times that 
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of ins iders from the voluntary filers . In year -1 insiders 
in voluntary firms become net e llers in dollar terms. 
while insider in involuntary firms continue to be net 
buyers. In year zero insiders in both types of firms 
are net se llers in dollar terms, but the net dollar 
se ll ing by in siders in the vo luntary firm s is more 
than five times greater than that of the involuntary 
in iders. These results are confirmed by examining 
figure 4, which shows that, on average, insiders of 
Journal of Business and Leadership: Research. Practice. and Teaching 
involuntary filers accumulate approximately $2 million 
in new stock during years -2 to 0, while insiders of 
voluntary filers divest themse lves of approximate ly 
$300,000 in stock over the same period. These findings 
prov ide further evidence that the mi sa lignment of 
incentives thought to occur during bankruptcy manifests 
itse lf most strongly among managers and insiders 
voluntari ly placing their firms into Chapter I I 
bankruptcy. 
Table 5: Insider Trading Around the Bankruptcy Announcement 
Panel A: Insider Tradi na (i n S hares) 
:'\et Inside r T radi ng ,·ear -2 vear - I vear 0 
Voluntary -6. 190 -224.726 -72.028 
In volun tary 38.263 9.42 I -26.864 
C umul a ti ve i\'et Insider Tradi nl! year -2 vear - I yea r 0 
Voluntary -6. 190 -230.9 I 6 -302.944. 
Involuntary 38.263 47.684 20.820 
Panel B: Insider Tradina (i n Dollars) 
:>let Insider Tradi ng vea r -2 year -I vear 0 
Voluntal) $340.4 7-1 -$361.225 -$293 .948 
Jnvoluntan $1.-175.593 $542.827 -$53 .922 
C umulative :'\et Insid er Tradi ng vear -2 vear -I vear 0 
Voluntal) $340.4 74 -$20.75 I -$31 -1 .699 
Jnvolunta!) $I .4 75.593 $2.0 I 8.420 $ I .964.498 
Figure 3 shown below depicts cu mulative net insider trading in shares for years -2, -I and zero relat ive to the year 
of the bankruptcy filing (year zero). 
Figure 3: Cumulative Net Insider Trading (Number of Shares) 
S2 , 5 00 , 0 0 0 1 
S2 ,0 0 D . 0 0 0 I 
S t , 500 , 000 
" ·"' ·"' \ 
S 500 ,000 \ 
" \ 
· S5 00 ,0DO 
J1 0 D 
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Figure 4 hown .below depi cts cumulative net insider trading in doll ars for years -2 1 
of the bankruptcy film g (year zero). , - and zero relative to the year 
Figure 4: Cu mulative Net Insider Trading (Dollar Volume) 
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Thi s table reports post-bankruptcy outcomes for the 
samples of firms filing vo luntary and involuntary 
bankruptcy. Information is obtained from The Directory 
of Obsolete Securities , Lexis/Nexis, and Reuters 
Journal of Business and Leadership : Research. Practice. and Teaching 
Financial Services . The difference between the means /-
statistic tests whether the mean post-bankruptcy outcome 
for the subgroups are s ignificantly different from one 
another. 
Table 6: Post-Bankruptcy Outcomes 
Type of BankruptcY Resoluti on Voluntary Firms 
Mergersffakeovers and Acq uisitions 15 .9% 
Successful Reorganization 42 .1% 
Liquidati ons/Fai lures 42.1% 
.. 
• S 1gn 1 fi cant at the five percent leve l. 
Post-Bankruptcy Outcomes 
Finally_ we compare the post-bankruptcy outcomes 
of th e two types of firms . Information is obtained from 
The Directory of Obsolete Securities, Lexis/Nexis, and 
Reuters Financial Services. These results are 
summari zed in Table 6. The rates with which the two 
types of firms merge with or are taken over by other 
firm s a re almost identical: 16% of the vo luntary filers 
and 15% of the in vo luntary fi lers emerge from 
bankruptcy as part of a merge r o r takeover. There are 
significantly different pattern s in their respective rates of 
reorganization and I iquidation, however. Sixty-one 
percent of the involuntary filers eventua lly comp lete a 
successful reorganization, compared w ith onl y 42% of 
the vo luntary filers. Forty-two percent of the vo luntary 
filers eve ntua lly liquidate their firm s, while only 24% of 
the vo luntary fi lers meet a simi lar fate . The lower 
frequency of successful reorganization and higher rate of 
liquidati on for the vo luntary fil ers provides further 
support for the view that insiders of firms filin g 
vo luntary bankruptcy have a greater reduction in their 
incentives to max imize shareho lder wealth than the 
insiders of firm s that are petitioned into bankruptcy by 
their creditors. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous studies reach different conclusions 
regarding how much responsibility for financial di stress 
rests with the firm ' s managers . We hypothesize that 
these findings may be due to differences in the behaviors 
of managers filing voluntary C hapter 11 bankruptcy vs. 
managers of firms that are petitioned into bankruptcy by 
their creditors. We argue that greater misalignments of 
manager and shareholder interests are more like ! ~ to 
occur when managers choose to place the firm mto 
Chapter 11 via a vo luntary bankruptcy petition than 
when firms are petitioned into bankruptcy by their 
creditors. 
We find that the financial performance and leverage 
lnvoluntan' Firms Difference Between the Means /-s tatistic 
21 
15.2% -0.18 
60.6% 1. 88 
24 .2% 2.00 
of both types of firm s are s imilar in the years precedi ng 
the bankruptcy announcement, which indicates that pre-
bankruptcy financial performance and capital structure 
are not significant determin ants of the type of 
bankruptcy filin g. We present ev idence that the 
shareholders of firms filing vo luntary Chapter II suffer 
significantly greater losses at the time of the bankruptcy 
announcement than shareholders of firms petitioned into 
bankruptcy. Moreover. insiders of firm s filing voluntary 
bankruptcy are net se llers of their firm 's stock in the 
years leading up to bankruptcy, both in terms of shares 
and dollar trading volume, while insiders of invo luntary 
filers are found to be net buyers of their firm's stock over 
the same period . These findings strongly suggest a 
greater mi sa lignment of manager/shareholder interests in 
firm s filing for vo luntary bankruptcy. We a lso find that 
firm s filing for vo luntary bankruptcy successfully 
reorgani ze less frequently and liquidate more freq uently 
than firms entering bankruptcy via in vo luntary creditor 
pet ition s. 
In summary, firm s filing for voluntary bankruptcy 
exhibit a more negat ive market reaction to the 
bankruptcy announcement, a hi gher leve l of insider 
se lling, and a greater frequency of negati ve post-
bankruptcy outcomes than firms entering bankruptcy via 
creditor-initiated petitions. T hese findings provide 
support for the idea that insiders of firms filing for 
voluntary bankruptcy have red uced incentives to 
max imize shareholder wealth compared with the insiders 
of firm s filin g invo luntary bankruptcy. The results of 
this study are important for regulators and leg is lators 
that establish policy governing bankruptcy and insider 
trading laws, as U.S . bankruptcy law and the laws 
governin g insider tradin g leading up to bankruptcy 
filings are drawing increased scrutiny, and are likely to 
undergo sign ifi cant reform in the near future . 
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